Estimating the impact of inward offshore industry outsourcing on developing economies by Karavasilev, Yani & Nomura, Shigeharu
Osaka University
Title Estimating the impact of inward offshore industry outsourcingon developing economies
Author(s)Karavasilev, Yani; Nomura, Shigeharu
Citation大阪大学経済学. 65(1) P.35-P.64
Issue Date2015-06
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://doi.org/10.18910/57091
DOI 10.18910/57091
Rights
OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS June 2015Vol.65 No.1
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide the first empirical study on the impact of outsourcing in 
the non-natural-resource-related industrial sector on the economy of the host country. Due to 
the lack of data on outsourcing, this study uses proxy measures and utilizes static and dynamic 
econometric models to estimate the nature and magnitude of the impact of outsourcing in 115 
developing countries in the period 2000-2012. The effects of outsourcing are compared to those 
of inward FDI. Results obtained for developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa are compared. The findings show that outsourcing has positive impact 
on the recipient economies, but Asia stands out as receiving most benefits while outsourcing has 
no significant effects on Latin American economies. Eastern European economies benefit from 
FDI as much as they do from outsourcing. Considering the results and existing theories, potential 
policies are formulated.
JEL Classification : F14, F21, F43
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1. Introduction
Despite the attention that offshore outsourcing currently demands in the public media, there is little 
empirical evidence on its economic impact. As a consequence of rising fears of job losses associated 
with the phenomenon, most existing research on the subject is primarily concerned with addressing 
the perceived job losses in the country of origin, most commonly the USA. The impacts on recipient 
economies, however, have remained under-researched. This paper surveys the empirical literature on 
international (also called offshore) outsourcing and attempts to estimate its effects on the opposite 
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end, namely recipient developing economies, defined as non-high income by the World Bank. The 
leading research questions were (1) how to provide a valid measure of inward outsourcing, including 
how to disentangle it from FDI, (2) how do the effects of outsourcing differ from those of FDI, (3) 
how do these effects differ across the major regions and income groups and why this is the case. 
Our focus is on outsourcing in the industry sector (excluding natural-resource-related industries), 
as opposed to overall outsourcing or outsourcing in services. The motivations are that (1) similar 
to Alfaro and Charlton’s argument, by restricting the analysis to the industrial sector the results 
can be straightforwardly compared to the existing theories and findings which are more focused on 
manufacturing than services, (2) industry indicators can be measured relatively easily due to the 
availability of data, (3) so far no country has skipped the industrialization stage in its development and 
this is relevant considering that the focus of this study is developing economies, where the industrial 
sector is usually more important to the economy than it is in developed ones, at least in relative terms. 
Consequently, the rest of this paper is structured as follows: section two discusses the definition of 
outsourcing and previous research on its effects in recipient economies, section three presents our 
contribution to the outsourcing calculation methodology, section four deals with the data, sample and 
variables used in the empirical analysis, section five contains descriptive statistics and the results of 
the empirical analysis, section six discusses the implications of these results, section seven outlines 
policy recommendations based on the analysis, and section eight concludes the paper and suggests 
paths for future research.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Offshoring, Outsourcing and FDI: conceptual framework
According to the WTO, there is no accepted definition of “offshoring” in the public debate nor in the 
economic literature. According to the definition accepted by the WTO, offshoring is defined by firm 
activities being geographically relocated from the firm’s domestic country to a lower-cost foreign 
country (Sako 2006; Farrell 2004; Levy 2005; Conductor et al. 2010). However, there is variation as 
to whether offshoring activities are relocated within the same company (see Marin 2006; Miroudot, 
Lanz, and Ragoussis 2009), or whether they may are outsourced to another firm (see Sako 2006; 
Contractor et al. 2010). According to Park et al. (2013), in conjunction with the Institute of Developing 
Economies, and the Japan External Trade Organization (IDE, JETRO), WTO uses the term offshoring 
to refer to intra-firm trade, foreign direct investments (such as mergers and acquisitions or “greenfield” 
investment), while international outsourcing is used to refer to arm’s length sub-contracting, as 
presented in Table 0 based on Miroudot (2009).
Table 0. Movement of activities in outsourcing and offshoring
Geographical location
Domestic Abroad
Organizational 
location
Within the firm
(in-house domestic 
production) Foreign Direct Investment (vertical or horizontal)
Outside the firm Domestic Outsourcing Offshore or International Outsourcing
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OECD relies on UN’s very similar definition, whereby outsourcing means acquiring products or 
services from an outside (unaffiliated) domestic company or an offshore supplier, whereas offshoring 
involves either an unaffiliated foreign company (offshore outsourcing) or investing in a foreign 
affiliate (offshore in-house sourcing, or FDI).1 Feenstra, who together with Hanson authored the most 
influential study on measuring the impacts of outward outsourcing, also uses a similar definition (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1. Organization choices for the firm by Feenstra (2010)
Location of production process
Home country Foreign country
Ownership of production process
In-house Integration Multinational
Outsource Domestic outsourcing Foreign outsourcing
Based on these definitions, in this study we use the term offshore outsourcing, or international 
outsourcing, to designate the partial relocation of a firm’s production to an unaffiliated company 
located in a foreign country, in other words foreign arm’s length transactions. We use the term 
offshoring to designate the combined practices of FDI (relocation production to a foreign affiliate, i.e. 
a branch of the same company located abroad or a different company controlled by the former) and 
international outsourcing. 
Providing a definition of outsourcing is one thing, but disentangling offshore outsourcing from FDI 
is not so easy in practice. This is mainly due to the fact that there are two main kinds of FDI – vertical 
(VFDI) and horizontal (HFDI). Using the skill level required for these different wealth creation 
practices provides a simple way of classifying them. Considering the skill levels typically required, 
Alfaro and Charlton (2007) rank the various wealth creation practices in global production sharing in 
the following way: 
(a) Most skill-intensive: Horizontal FDI
(b) Medium skill-intensive: Vertical FDI
(c) Least skill-intensive: Outsourcing
Miroudot (2009), who provides an excellent definition framework for the different kinds of 
sourcing, points outs that while in theory it is easy to differentiate between vertical FDI and 
outsourcing, in practice outsourcing and vertical FDI are so similar in their intent and purpose, that a 
number of authors have argued that there exist few differences between VFDI and outsourcing from 
the firm’s perspective, for example Antràs (2003, 2005), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004, 2005). 
Therefore, when measuring outsourcing the risk of including some VFDI is always present. 
2.2. Studies on offshoring to developing countries
While there is a general consensus that FDI is largely beneficial to the host country, especially in 
terms of productivity gains (see Amiti, and Wei, 2006, Görg and Hanley, 2004, 2005, Egger and 
1 Glossary of statistical terms, OECD.
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Egger, 2006, and Calabrese and Erbetta, 2005) there has been no genuine empirical research on how 
outsourcing affects the recipient economy. 
The most relevant study seems to be by Grover (2005), who examines theoretically the benefits 
of a host country that can be attributed to outsourcing vis-à-vis FDI. Grover claims that the host 
country is affected in a different way depending on whether production sharing arrangement is 
internalized by the parent firm in the form of a VFDI relationship or transacted externally through 
outsourcing contracts. Grover theorizes that a recipient county’s ability to maximize benefit in these 
two regimes is contingent on its absorptive capacity. If the host country’s absorptive capacity is 
above a threshold level, outsourcing is more beneficial to the economy as compared to VFDI and 
even with an absorptive capacity below this threshold, outsourcing is still as beneficial as VFDI. 
Grover defines absorptive capacity in terms of the skill level of the labor force. Based on evidence 
from existing literature, he hypothesizes that an unaffiliated supplier employs a higher skill intensive 
technique of production vis-à-vis a subsidiary. In other words, ceteris paribus, outsourcing is more 
skill-intensive than VFDI, partly because local firms use older and less productive technology than 
foreign subsidiaries, which means that in order to stay competitive they have to employ workers with 
better skills, who can compensate for the lack of modern technology. One purpose of the present study 
is to test this hypothesis by comparing the effects of FDI versus outsourcing on various aspects of the 
economy of the host country.
One of the few papers to engage in an empirical analysis of offshore outsourcing and its impact on 
productivity was authored by Egger and Egger (2001) who studied the impact of outsourcing on the 
productivity levels of low-skilled workers using data on 22 manufacturing industries (2-digit NACE) 
in 12 EU countries over the period 1992-1997. Estimating a production function with CES properties, 
they found that in the short run, a one percentage increase in the outsourcing intensity would lead to a 
0.18% decrease in labor productivity of low-skilled workers. In the long run, which was estimated by 
excluding specific effects from the regression, this effect was reversed to a 0.53% increase.
This effect is to some extent supported by Siegel and Griliches (1991) while Amity and Wei (2004) 
find that there is no clear effect on productivity from material offshore outsourcing, but that there are 
large positive effects from offshore outsourcing in services.
3. Measuring manufacturing outsourcing
3.1. Existing methodologies and issues
A major problem with the definitions outlined in the previous section is that they do not concord easily 
with officially collected economic data. Outsourcing decisions are made at the micro level of plants 
or firms, while the official data are generally collected at the sectorial and national level. Despite 
that, there have been numerous attempts at measuring outsourcing, all of them focusing on outward 
outsourcing.
By far the most widespread measure of outward offshore outsourcing used in the literature is 
derived from the model proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, 1999). They estimate 
outward offshore outsourcing from the USA as the share of imported intermediate inputs over total 
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costs, which for each industry i can be denoted as:
where X stands for input purchases of good j by industry i, Y is total non-energy input used by 
industry i, M is import of good j, and C is the consumption of good j. By restricting their calculation 
to those inputs that are purchased from the same industry as that in which the good is being produced 
(using 2-digit SIC industry codes), Feenstra and Hanson calculate a “narrow” measure of outsourcing. 
They also develop a second measure called “differential outsourcing”, which represents as the 
difference between their total outsourcing estimate and narrow outsourcing.
Although the narrow measure defined by Feenstra and Hanson is widely used, and is in line with 
the WTO definition of international outsourcing, there is no consensus that it is the most appropriate 
measure. For instance, as also noted by Olsen (2006), Girma and Görg (2004), argue that the measure 
is too wide, particularly as far as analyses at the establishment level are concerned. 
In the same vein, Abraham and Taylor (1996) suggest an even narrower measure which only 
includes the contracting out of machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services, 
accounting services, computer services, and janitorial services. Egger and Egger’s (2001) paper 
discussed in the previous section, and Helg and Tajoli (2004) also use a narrower measure restricting 
offshore outsourcing to outward processing. This measure includes only the intermediate exports for 
processing that are re-imported.
Sitchinava (2008) summarizes outward outsourcing measurement methods and identifies three 
major types of existing measures using intermediate goods, namely (1) Trade in parts and components, 
(2) Proxies based on input-output relationships and (3) Others, i.e. processing trade. According to 
Sitchinava, the first method, trade in parts and components, has been the most common approach to 
assess the trade in intermediate inputs or global production sharing. Pioneered by Yeats (2001), this 
line of methodology has focused on the trend of cross-border fragmentation of production, which 
initially began as North-North trade, but rapidly transitioned into trade between the developed and 
developing countries. The second input-output approach which estimates trade in intermediate goods 
combining data on total imports with output data to determine the extent of an industry’s purchases 
of intermediate inputs from overseas suppliers. This is the measure proposed by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996). The third group of measures tend to focus on a subset of trade in intermediates. They usually 
use highly industry-specific and product-specific disaggregated data which is the reason why they are 
usually greatly limited in the scope of their country, commodity, and year coverage. Studies using this 
third method seem to be the most common in existing literature. 
Despite the differing methodologies, one common thing is the use of trade in intermediates and the 
related intra-industry trade as a proxy for outsourcing. Since outsourcing operates on the principle 
of comparative advantage and involves a lot of trade of intermediate as well as final goods, trade in 
intermediates is obviously related to outsourcing but then the issue of disentangling the effects of 
trade in intermediates and those of outsourcing comes into question, discussed next.
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3.2. Measurement issues
It can be seen that in addition to the ambiguity surrounding the disentanglement of outsourcing and 
VFDI, when it comes to measuring, disentangling outsourcing from trade in intermediate goods is 
equally relevant. In relation to the latter, there is also the issue of directionality: seminal studies like 
the ones by Feenstra and Hason, Hsieh and Woo (2005), Lawrence (1994), Slaughter (2000), Berman 
et al (1994) and Geishecker and Görg (2005) all rely on data on imported intermediate inputs in order 
to measure outward outsourcing. This in itself means that a very strong assumption has been made 
about the relationship between the direction of outsourcing and that of trade in intermediates, which 
could cast doubts about the validity of what is ‘inward’ and ‘outward’.
As is well known, the label “Made in country X” implies that the last stage of production, usually 
the assembly, happened in country X, but it provides neither information about the origin of the 
components contained in the final product nor information about their added value. The assembly, 
or the least skill-intensive, most labor-intensive part of the production process, and thus, supposedly, 
the link of the value chain that has the least amount of value added, is in fact the final step in the 
production cycle, and following the skill intensity hierarchy discussed in section 2.1 it would be 
assumed that it is likely to be the part of the value chain that is outsourced abroad, rather than kept at 
home, which is the assumption of the methodology in question. Therefore, it could easily claimed that 
outward outsourcing does not in fact involve importing intermediate inputs, but instead, final goods. 
In this way using intermediate imports to measure outward outsourcing is not completely consistent 
with the skill intensity hierarchy discussed in section 2.1. 
Especially in the case of manufacturing it is logically the country of assembly, which is usually 
the labor-intensive low-wage country that is the recipient of outsourcing, that needs to import the 
unfinished goods from either the country where the final good is to be exported, or from a third 
country that has better technology. Hence, using intermediate imports as the sole factor in calculating 
outsourcing, involves the risk of calculating the total amount (inward plus outward) outsourcing 
instead of outward outsourcing only, while at the same failing to include outsourcing of the final 
assembly stage of the valued chain, whose output is usually final goods. There is also the risk of not 
taking into account outsourcing that uses inputs originating in the recipient country, and of including 
intermediate imports from companies in the recipient country not engaging in outsourcing practices.
Most importantly, however, there is the issue of FDI-outsourcing distinction, which is problematic 
if only intermediate input data is used when proxying for outsourcing. Following the initial seminal 
study of Feenstra and Hanson, in his 2010 study Feenstra in fact changed the word outsourcing to 
offshoring in order to include FDI and he uses the term ‘offshoring’ when he cites his previous studies 
on outsourcing. He proposes a classification of international production sharing activities summarized 
in Table 2.
Considering this, while still relying on intermediate good statistics and on the same assumptions 
about the directionality of trade, the calculation method we propose in the next section tries to partly 
solve the issue by addressing the crucial distinction of outsourcing vs. FDI.
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3.3. Our methodology
In order to measure the total international inward manufacturing outsourcing activity in the recipient 
economy i for year t we propose the following equation and use it to calculate outsourcing in the 
empirical part of the study:
where  stands for international inward industry outsourcing,  is the intermediate exports in industry i, 
 is the inward FDI stock and  is the percentage of foreign affiliates of total firms in industry i.
Following the logic of the Feenstra-Hanson method, which uses intermediate imports to account 
for outward outsourcing, we use intermediate exports to account for inward outsourcing. The 
United Nations Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 121, 22, 42 and 53 were used to define the term 
‘intermediate manufactured good’ based on Ueki (2011) and Gaulier et al. (2005) who provide 
a definition of intermediates, according to which products with the following BEC codes can be 
considered intermediate goods. In fact, their definition also includes category 32, but since we 
consider this category as related to natural resource industries, it was excluded. Refer to Table 2 for 
detailed descriptions of the BEC categories. The UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, 
which defines the main end-use of products (primary, intermediate, capital or consumption goods) is 
utilized by a number of other related empirical studies such as Fontagne (2006). 
Table 2. Definition of intermediate goods by Ueki (2011) and Gaulier et al. (2005)
3-stage 
product 
classification
5-stage product 
classification
BEC 
code
Title in BEC
Intermediate 
goods
Semi-finished goods
121 Foods and beverages mainly for industry
22 Processed industrial supplies not elsewhere specified
32 Processed fuels and lubricants**
Parts and components
42
Capital goods (except transport equipment), and parts and 
accessories thereof
53 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof
**Not included in outr definition.
Once the amount of intermediate industrial exports, which is supposed to capture offshoring in its 
entirety including outsourcing and VFDI, is calculated, the amount of FDI is subtracted from it in 
order to isolate outsourcing. Since no data is available concerning the amount of FDI for each of these 
industries, we proxied by multiplying the percentage of foreign affiliates in the non-natural-resource 
industries by the relative weight of the non-natural-resource industrial sector in the economy, and then 
by the total amount of FDI stock. Despite seeming far-fetched, the face value of the results is more 
than satisfactory, as will be discussed in section 5.
In our estimation, we would have liked to account for intermediate exports by local firms not 
engaging in offshoring practices, as well as non-exported intermediate and final products of 
outsourcing activities intended for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, due to data constraints, 
accounting for these was at this stage beyond our capabilities, so it had to be assumed that the opposite 
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effects of these two potentially existent phenomena would cancel each other out2. Future research 
would be necessary to ascertain the validity of this assumption.
4. Data, sample and variables
4.1. Data 
In the data assembly process attention was paid to the following factors: the reputability of the data 
source, the availability of data over at least a decade for as many countries as possible to ensure a 
valid panel data analysis, and the standardization of data using units of measurements that ensure 
comparability without excessive data manipulation in order to ensure a reliable cross-country analysis. 
For various reasons not discussed here for considerations of space, data which would otherwise be 
useful to the present study, such as the one provided by ILO, UNIDO, OECD, the World Input-Output 
Tables and several consultancies was eventually not used. Instead, data was primarily sourced from 
COMTRADE, UNCTAD, IMF, ITC and the World Bank.
Specifically, data on imports of intermediate goods, which was used to construct the key 
independent variable in this analysis, was sourced from the COMTRADE unit of the UN. Data on 
international trade, FDI and other macroeconomic indicators was taken from UNCTAD and IMF. 
Data on various aspects of economic and social development was obtained from the World Bank. Data 
on the number of foreign affiliates in a country was taken from ITC. Additionally, data on various 
aspects of the quality of a country’s institutions and political situation was sourced from the Heritage 
Foundation.3 
4.2. Sample
Data was sourced between June and September 2014, and it was assembled into a panel consisting of 
176 countries, including representatives of all income groups and geographic regions of the world, 
small and large states alike, considered to be a representative sample, including more than 90% of 
the 193 UN member states. Some of the relatively large countries not present in the analysis include 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, North Korea, the DRC, Chad, Liberia, as well as some UN non-members with 
disputed sovereignty (e.g. Western Sahara, Somalia, Kosovo, the Vatican) and countries that only 
came into being recently and do not report independent data for the entire period of the study (East 
Timor, South Sudan etc.). It should be noted that since ITC provides data on the number of foreign 
affiliates only for developing countries, and since the focus of this study is inward outsourcing, which 
is believed to occurs mainly in low-wage countries, only non-high-income states were used in this 
analysis, amounting to a total of 115 counties for which key data was fully available (refer to Table B 
in the appendix).
The time period covered is the years 2000 through 2012. The resulting panel consists of over 
2 Excluding non-exported outsourcing-related production would underestimate the actual intensity of outsourcing 
practices, whereas including non-outsourcing exports of intermediates would bias it upwards.
3 The latter was used for constructing instruments using principal component analysis but those were used in the 
preliminary tests not reported in this paper. It is available on request. Table A in the appendix provides the respective 
source for each variable in this study.
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60 relevant variables, rendering a total of about 150,000 country-year-variable observations. 
Unfortunately, not every single cell contains data, but STATA defines the panel as strongly balanced, 
and unit-root tests (in this case, the Fisher unit-root test based on the augmented version of Dickey-
Fuller test was used) did not suggest the presence of stationary data. Therefore, the sample data was 
deemed appropriate for the purposes of the study. 
4.3. Variables
Apart from the amount of inward offshore outsourcing, the main independent variable of interest, 
measured in relative terms as a percentage of a country’s GDP and in absolute terms, as outsourcing 
per employee in manufacturing, using the authors’ calculation method, as specified in the previous 
section, Table A in the appendix provides a list of the control variables used in the empirical part of 
this study along with their sources. Those include standard factors widely controlled for in related 
empirical literature such as macroeconomic, demographic and social indicators. 
Several dummy variables were also used to control for the income groups and the geographical 
region of a country with respect to the main locations of outsourcing, namely developing Asia, Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe in the broad sense. Table B in the appendix 
contains a full list of the countries in the analysis according to their region. 
The selection of dependent variables, on the other hand, was aimed at pinpointing factors that could 
be used as proxies for the hypothesized beneficial effects of outsourcing on the host economy. Two 
variables were used, mainly because this would allow for additional robustness tests:
(1) Output (GDP) per employee in non-natural-resource-related industries in constant 1990 USD
(2) Output (GDP) per employee in the entire economy
These dependent variables were expected to capture the direct positive effects of outsourcing on 
the economy, particularly on manufacturing, without focusing excessively on spillover effects, which 
are harder to measure. The first one was calculated by subtracting natural-resource rents from the 
industrial GDP of the country, and then dividing that amount by the number of industry employees. 
Since the number of employees in natural-resource-related industries, we focus on the more general 
effects of outsourcing rather than effects on skill levels, and industry-specific effects. One of the 
main motivations to use these independent variables is also consideration of demographic factors. 
In countries with high percentage of children (sometimes over 50%) or/and high unemployment/
low labor participation/grey economy rates statistics such as GDP per person might provide a 
very distorted picture of actual productivity levels, which we hope to correct for by using the 
abovementioned dependent variables.
5. Empirical analysis
Based on the theoretical framework and previous literature discussed in the previous sections, we 
hypothesize that since outsourcing is the least skill-intensive of the offshoring practices, its amount 
will be the largest in low-skilled labor-abundant countries, while FDI would be concentrated in 
countries with a high level of skill concentration. Additionally, we expect positive effects for 
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outsourcing on the recipient economy. We expect that since outsourcing is relatively a more recent and 
less skill-intensive phenomenon than FDI, its size will be smaller than FDI, but following Grover, we 
expect that its benefits on recipient economies might be equal or larger than FDI, though it depends on 
the absorptive capacity of the country. 
5.1. Estimating the size of offshoring
The results from our calculation concerning the intensity of outsourcing in non-high-income 
economies are presented in Table C in the appendix. After the total amount of outsourcing was 
calculated, outsourcing was also calculated as percentage of GDP and also per employee in the 
manufacturing sector.
It can be observed that China is by far the largest recipient of outsourcing with an average annual 
value added of 341 billion USD, followed by Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Brazil, Indonesia 
etc. As a percentage of a country’s GDP, outsourcing seems to play a large role in Malaysia, Hungary, 
Guyana, Papua New Guinea etc. 
Especially with regard to the total amount of outsourcing, it can easily be seen that our findings 
to a large extent coincide with the rankings of major consultancies, which publish annual reports on 
top performing outsourcing locations4 (refer to Table D in the appendix). The correspondence is even 
more striking when it is taken into consideration that we are only estimating outsourcing in industries 
while consultancies and institutes include services as well. 
The rankings also live up to our hypotheses: in contrast to FDI whose amount is positively 
correlated with the development and industrialization level of a country, we do not see this trend as far 
as outsourcing is concerned. In addition, the numbers seem fairly plausible, considering the serious 
shortcomings of our estimation method discussed above.
Having established the satisfactory validity of our estimation, we proceed with the empirical 
analysis of the effects of outsourcing on developing regions.
5.2. Econometric models
The model was formulated in the following pattern:
(1)  lnyij = α + β1lnOutsourcingij + β2lnInwardFDI ij + β3lnXij + β4AsiaDummyij + 
β5EasternEuropeDummyij + β6LatinAmericaDummyij + εij
where y represents GDP per employee in constant 1990 USD, ‘Outsourcing’ and ‘InwardFDI’ 
respectively stand for the two dependent variables of interest, inward outsourcing and FDI, ‘X’ is a 
vector of control variables, whose number was adjusted for every model with a view to maximizing 
the amount of explained variance and minimizing multicollinearity. The full list included in the 
analyses discussed below include gross fixed-capital formation (‘GCF’) as percentage of GDP, 
tertiary enrollment ratios, the GINI coefficient of inequality, the percentage of labor force having 
obtained tertiary education qualification (‘TertiarEduLaborForce’), savings as percentage of GDP. 
4 Some consultancies which provide similar rankings are AT Kearney, Clutch, Tholons, Gartner, Inc., Sourcing Line (see 
references).
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The GDP deflator which reflect the relative price levels of a country (including labor costs) and the 
importance of natural resources calculates as rents as a ratio of GDP (‘NatResRents’). ‘AsiaDummy’, 
‘EasternEuropeDummy’ and ‘LatinAmericaDummy’ are self-explanatory dummy variables denoting 
whether a country belongs to the respective region. Eastern Europe in this context includes also all ex-
USSR countries.
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares, fixed effects (excluding the dummy 
variables) and finally using the Arellano-Bond-developed ‘xtabond’ method using variable lags to 
correct for endogeneity. All calculations were run using robust standard errors and adjusted R-square. 
In order to reduce the probability of multicollinearity and to standardize the indicators, all variables 
used in the analyses reported here are in their natural log format (ln), following the practice in 
empirical literature.
5.3. Pooled OLS
The results from the OLS regression (Table 3) show that outsourcing does have significant, positive 
and very large effects on GDP per employee. When FDI is included in the model, the effect of 
outsourcing diminished slightly but is still 50% larger than that of FDI. When further control variables 
are added, the effects of FDI become insignificant in contrast to those of outsourcing, which remain 
robustly significant in every specification and they retain almost the same value, ranging between 0.14 
to 0.18, which in logarithmic terms means that 1% increase in the amount of inward outsourcing is 
related to 0.14 – 0.18 increase in GDP per employee. 
Table 3. Pooled OLS
Sample: all countries Dependent variable: GDP per employee in 1990 USD
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.184 0.148 0.177 0.137 0.137 0.146
(0.015)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.037)**
Asia -0.610 -0.549 -0.564 -0.597 -0.597 -0.774
(0.065)** (0.068)** (0.069)** (0.066)** (0.066)** (0.116)**
Latin America -0.099 -0.128 -0.078 -0.130 -0.130 -0.319
(0.062) (0.062)* (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.119)**
Eastern Europe -0.179 -0.187 -0.194 -0.341 -0.341 -0.470
(0.061)** (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.093)**
Africa -1.755 -1.748 -1.644 -1.211 -1.211 -1.376
(0.057)** (0.057)** (0.059)** (0.083)** (0.083)** (0.167)**
lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.091 0.091 0.037 0.037 0.066
(0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024) (0.024) (0.035)
lnGCF (% of GDP) 0.158 0.183 0.183 0.476
(0.057)** (0.073)* (0.073)* (0.111)**
lnTertiaryEnrollment 0.303 0.303 0.263
(0.031)** (0.031)** (0.060)**
lnGINI 0.415
(0.213)
_cons 9.510 9.124 8.585 7.842 7.842 5.520
(0.047)** (0.112)** (0.196)** (0.245)** (0.245)** (0.902)**
R2 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.83 0.75
N 719 708 686 495 495 235
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS, robust standard errors
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To no surprise, apart from outsourcing, the factors that seem to contribute most to a higher GDP 
per employee across countries are tertiary education, GCF and inequality (higher inequality meaning 
higher GDP per employee, as a higher GINI index reflects higher inequality levels). Although 
preliminary correlations tests revealed no significant correlations, VIF tests were run to confirm the 
absence of multicollinearity. Considering this, the results are deemed valid and models have a very 
high explanatory power overall, reaching adjusted R-square of 0.83, further validating our selection of 
control variables.
5.4. Fixed-effects
In order to explore the effects of outsourcing at the individual country level, the fixed-effects 
estimation was applied (results in Table 4). In fact, the Hausman test reveals that fixed effects are more 
appropriate than random effects, which is reasonable considering the huge inter-country variation. 
At the country level too, the effects of outsourcing are unwaveringly positive, large and significant 
at the 0.01 level, regardless of how many control variables are added. The robustness of the results is 
further supported by the fact that the size of the effects are quite similar in the OLS (0.14 – 0.18) and 
fixed-effects models (0.08 – 0.15). 
The effects of FDI, on the other hand, seem larger and more consistently significant in the 
fixed-effects model. In fact, at the individual country level, FDI seems to have larger effects than 
outsourcing in almost all specifications. This is highly plausible since the scale of FDI is larger than 
that of outsourcing, as revealed by our calculations concerning the size of outsourcing in the previous 
section. Here too, the explanatory power of the various specifications is quite high, with adjusted 
R-square of up to 0.81.
Table 4. Fixed-effects
Sample: all countries Dependent variable: GDP per employee in 1990 USD
lnOutsourcing
 (% of GDP)
0.147 0.077 0.123 0.119 0.095 0.075 0.080 0.091
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.022)** (0.023)**
lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.144 0.161 0.153 0.146 0.075 0.077 0.086
(0.011)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.017)** (0.022)** (0.022)**
lnTertiarEduLabor
Force
0.089 0.098 0.037 0.030 -0.001 -0.028
(0.032)** (0.032)** (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.034)
lnGCF (% of GDP) 0.074 0.114 0.078 0.050 0.052
(0.035)* (0.039)** (0.035)* (0.044) (0.044)
lnSavings (% of GDP) -0.005 -0.009 -0.017 -0.020
(0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
lnGDPdeflator -0.275 -0.296 -0.286
(0.041)** (0.051)** (0.051)**
lnGINI -0.090 -0.097
(0.121) (0.120)
lnNatResRents 
(% of GDP)
-0.027
(0.017)
_cons 8.880 8.291 8.431 8.216 8.320 9.062 9.610 9.687
(0.011)** (0.048)** (0.080)** (0.128)** (0.131)** (0.159)** (0.524)** (0.522)**
R2 0.17 0.33 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.81
N 719 708 241 240 206 206 126 126
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; fixed-effects, robust standard errors
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5.5. Across regions
We proceed to compare the effects of outsourcing across regions, by including only the countries 
belonging to the region of interest (Table 5). In order to preserve the degrees of freedom a simple 
regression with only outsourcing was run. The results show that outsourcing seems to be most 
beneficial for Asian economies (0.37%), followed by African and Eastern European economies (about 
0.20%), with moderately large effects in Middle Eastern economies (0.11%). Finally, in contrast to 
other regions, outsourcing appears to be irrelevant to Latin American economies.
Table 5. Outsourcing effects across regions
Asia CEE Africa ME LA
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.367 0.203 0.214 0.112 -0.010
(0.033)** (0.034)** (0.032)** (0.024)** (0.030)
_cons 8.707 9.308 7.739 9.521 9.542
(0.050)** (0.054)** (0.041)** (0.036)** (0.034)**
R2 0.52 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.00
N 115 170 204 94 136
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS; robust standard errors
Adding FDI does not change the conclusions – the values are almost the same, the significance 
and signs are consistent (Table 6). Interestingly, Eastern Europe seems to be the only region where 
economies experience significant effects from FDI. The results for the rest of the regions, where 
outsourcing seems to take precedence, are not significant. Eastern Europe is also the only region 
where the effects of FDI are larger than those of outsourcing. Assuming that skill levels in Eastern 
Europe are similar to those in the old advanced economies, while there is a gap in terms of skill 
endowments between advanced economies and the other regions, the results fit out hypothesis. As 
already discussed, FDI is considered more skill intensive than outsourcing. Geographical proximity 
might also be more important for FDI than for outsourcing.
Table 6. Outsourcing and FDI effects across regions
Asia CEE Africa ME LA
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.386 0.165 0.200 0.074 -0.001
(0.055)** (0.033)** (0.038)** (0.031)* (0.034)
lnFDI (% of GDP) -0.032 0.192 0.036 0.083 -0.032
(0.074) (0.044)** (0.049) (0.042) (0.061)
_cons 8.799 8.432 7.586 9.171 9.690
(0.244)** (0.209)** (0.206)** (0.183)** (0.285)**
R2 0.53 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.00
N 105 170 203 94 136
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS; robust standard errors
Overall, it could be concluded that outsourcing has very large impacts on Asian economies, FDI 
and outsourcing both have large impacts on Eastern European economies, and outsourcing alone has 
above-average impacts on African economies (considering the average impacts are about 0.08 – 0.15), 
and moderate to modest effects on Middle Eastern economies, while neither FDI nor outsourcing 
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seem to benefit Latin American economies.
5.6. Across income groups
As a further robustness check, we compared the effects of these two phenomena across various 
income groups (Table 7). Various income classifications were tried out, including the classic World 
Bank method, but the following one (GDP per capita of under 5,000, between 5,000 and 10,000 and 
over 10,000 USD per capita), seems to provide the best results in terms of effects and significance. 
Albeit with a low explanatory power, the model does provide an insight of outsourcing beneficiaries’ 
experiences depending on their income/development level. Namely, poorer developing countries 
appear to benefit more from outsourcing than wealthier ones, which is again very understandable 
considering that one of the main factors driving outsourcing is low labor costs. This also provides 
some support for our assumption that outsourcing tends to focus on lower-skill tasks such as assembly, 
than FDI.
Table 7. Outsourcing and FDI effects across income groups
Dependent variable: 
GDP per employee in 
1990 USD
PPP GDP 
per capita 
< $5,000
PPP GDP 
per capita 
$5-10,000
PPP GDP 
per capita 
>$10,000
PPP GDP 
per capita 
< $5000
PPP GDP 
per capita 
$5-10,000
PPP GDP 
per capita 
>$10,000
lnOutsourcing
(% of GDP)
0.076 0.063 0.040 0.094 0.046 0.054
(0.033)* (0.025)* (0.016)* (0.036)* (0.028) (0.018)**
lnFDI (% of GDP) -0.060 0.052 -0.053
(0.047) (0.033) (0.035)
_cons 8.200 9.458 9.764 8.436 9.249 10.013
(0.041)** (0.032)** (0.029)** (0.192)** (0.143)** (0.167)**
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05
N 331 228 160 330 218 160
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS; robust standard errors
5.7. Factoring in prices
As a final robustness check, we investigate the factor in price levels, only to have the results 
confirmed, that is to say, countries with lower price levels tend to benefit more from outsourcing than 
countries with higher price levels, and that the latter benefit disproportionately more from FDI than 
the former (Table 8).
Table 8. Outsourcing and FDI effects across price-level groups
GDP deflator >3 GDP deflator >2 GDP deflator > 1
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.185 0.160 0.158
(0.042)** (0.032)** (0.030)**
lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.028 0.152 0.207
(0.058) (0.044)** (0.040)**
_cons 8.542 8.112 7.936
(0.224)** (0.185)** (0.172)**
R2 0.08 0.10 0.13
N 276 594 693
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS; robust standard errors
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To sum up, from the results in this section, it appears that the typical developing country that 
benefits most from outsourcing is a low-priced Asian country on the lower end of the income scale, 
while the typical country that does not is a relatively higher-income and relatively expensive Latin 
American economy.
5.8. Robustness checks: Using an alternative dependent variable
Additional robustness test, whereby PPP GDP per employee in non-natural-resource-related industries 
was used as a dependent variable instead of GDP per employee in the entire economy, reveal that the 
results obtained in the previous section are highly robust, the sole difference being that FDI’s effects 
are two to three times larger than those of outsourcing, as compared to equally large to 50% larger 
in the previous section (Table 9). Numerically, the size of outsourcing remains unchanged. Another 
interesting difference concerning the control variables is that while in the economy as a whole GFC 
seems to be quite important, when it comes to non-natural-resource-related industries inequality seems 
to have greatly damaging effects and savings – a very large positive impact. 
Table 9. Robustness check: using an alternative dependent variable
ln PPP GDP per employee in non-natural-resource-related industries
lnOutsourcing 
(% of GDP)
0.179 0.108 0.109 0.105 0.089 0.085 0.049 0.065
(0.020)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)**
lnFDI 
(% of GDP)
0.235 0.266 0.259 0.225 0.147 0.183 0.214
(0.022)** (0.029)** (0.031)** (0.030)** (0.039)** (0.046)** (0.045)**
lnTertiarEdu
LaborForce
0.135 0.138 0.252 0.235 0.264 0.225
(0.052)** (0.052)** (0.060)** (0.059)** (0.080)** (0.077)**
lnGCF 
(% of GDP)
0.068 0.062 0.017 -0.000 -0.009
(0.075) (0.081) (0.080) (0.099) (0.094)
lnSavings 
(% of GDP)
0.247 0.242 0.343 0.319
(0.048)** (0.047)** (0.057)** (0.054)**
lnGDPdeflator -0.290 -0.299 -0.266
(0.095)** (0.108)** (0.103)*
lnGINI -0.671 -0.737
(0.264)* (0.252)**
lnNatResRents 
(% of GDP)
-0.113
(0.035)**
_cons 7.769 6.733 6.281 6.097 5.331 6.159 8.201 8.583
(0.019)** (0.100)** (0.146)** (0.249)** (0.278)** (0.384)** (1.189)** (1.138)**
R2 0.15 0.32 0.54 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.76 0.79
N 518 508 256 256 217 217 135 135
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; fixed-effects, robust standard errors
On a regional level (Table 10), Asia again stands out as the single largest beneficiary of the positive 
impacts of outsourcing, while in the rest of the regions outsourcing appears as having no significant 
effects. Meanwhile, in the rest of the regions, except Latin America, FDI seems to play the role that 
outsourcing is playing in Asia. Conspicuously, the only region where neither FDI nor outsourcing has 
positive effects on seems to be Latin America. 
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Table 10. Robustness check: across regions
Dep. var: ln PPP GDP per empl. 
in non-nat. resource industries
Asia CEE Africa ME LA
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.440 -0.012 0.188 -0.227 0.058
(0.055)** (0.044) (0.105) (0.077)** (0.033)
lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.032 0.421 0.371 0.355 0.021
(0.072) (0.066)** (0.132)** (0.088)** (0.056)
_cons 7.112 5.890 5.877 6.688 7.803
(0.245)** (0.308)** (0.547)** (0.373)** (0.271)**
R2 0.65 0.26 0.33 0.20 0.02
N 79 135 57 69 167
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; standard errors in brackets; OLS; robust standard errors
So far the results are very consistent and in line with our assumptions and hypotheses. In order to 
ascertain the presence of causality, however, we proceed with a lagged-variable estimation.
5.9. Dynamic models: across regions 
The Arellano-Bond estimation confirms the presence of causality in the case of FDI, as evidenced 
from the significant positive effects of the one-lag FDI independent variable, but it fails to do so in the 
case of outsourcing. 
At a region-specific level, FDI seems to generate higher levels of income and productivity in 
Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America, but not in Asia or the Middle East (Table 11).
Table 11. Xtabond dynamic models: across regions
 All Asia CEE Africa LA ME
L1.lnGDPperemployee 0.832 0.941 0.800 0.901 0.885 0.694
(0.021)** (0.022)** (0.040)** (0.039)** (0.069)** (0.076)**
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.026 0.051 0.077 0.019 0.012 -0.013
(0.005)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.008)* (0.012) (0.010)
L1. lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.002 -0.026 -0.025 0.006 0.008 0.022
(0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015)
lnFDI (% of GDP) -0.015 0.041 -0.049 -0.041 -0.010 0.031
(0.010) (0.026) (0.025)* (0.016)* (0.025) (0.020)
L1.lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.036 -0.017 0.051 0.041 0.053 0.029
(0.009)** (0.024) (0.020)* (0.015)** (0.024)* (0.019)
_cons 1.423 0.457 1.890 0.781 0.889 2.676
(0.172)** (0.168)** (0.318)** (0.297)** (0.610) (0.662)**
N 570 87 140 163 109 71
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; xtabond
5.10. Dynamic models: across income groups 
At the income-group level, (Table 12), in line with results in the previous section, FDI seems to cause 
higher levels of productivity and income, again, in relatively higher-income economies with PPP GDP 
per capita of over 5,000 USD.
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Table 12. Xtabond dynamic models: across income groups
PPP GDP per 
capita < $5,000
PPP GDP per 
capita $5-10,000
PPP GDP per 
capita >$10,000
L1.lnGDPperemployee 0.901 0.765 0.700
(0.032)** (0.041)** (0.060)**
lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.016 0.053 0.007
(0.007)* (0.013)** (0.009)
L1. lnOutsourcing (% of GDP) 0.001 -0.002 -0.009
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
lnFDI (% of GDP) -0.020 -0.032 -0.004
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016)
L1.lnFDI (% of GDP) 0.024 0.061 0.039
(0.014) (0.018)** (0.015)**
_cons 0.815 2.091 2.783
(0.255)** (0.349)** (0.518)**
N 257 170 143
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; xtabond
6. Discussion 
6.1. The extent and impact of outsourcing: summary
To summarize, Asian economies receive the largest amount of outsourcing relative to their economies, 
closely followed by Eastern European economies. Although Latin America ranks third, and Africa 
and the Middle East are at the bottom, with half of the relative amount of outsourcing that Asia and 
Eastern Europe attract (Table 13). 
The size of outsourcing and its impacts, however, are not necessarily related. In fact, our results 
show they are, with the notable exception of Latin America. Depending on the model, our results 
robustly suggest that 1% increase in outsourcing leads to an average of 0.08-0.15% increase in per-
employee non-natural-resource GDP, which is strikingly similar to the average effects of FDI stock, 
0.08-0.16%. 
The impact of outsourcing is positive in all specifications and ranges from a very large 0.37-0.39% 
in Asian economies to an above-average 0.17-0.21% in Eastern Europe and Africa, an average 0.10% 
in the Middle East and below-average insignificant virtually zero effects in Latin America. The 
corresponding FDI numbers range from 0.20% in Eastern Europe to no effect for other regions, which 
change to 0.36-0.42% for Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East if per capita instead of per 
employee GDP is used as a dependent variable, the effects remaining zero in Asia and Latin America. 
The dynamic tests suggest that the effects of FDI are indeed causal, while outsourcing fails the 
causality tests, implying that those effects are to a certain extent endogenous, which is inevitably 
related to the imperfect outsourcing estimation method. Nevertheless, the numbers seem to be valid 
when compared to existing research. For example, in their analysis of the benefits of offshoring to 
India, the McKinsey Global Institute (2003) estimates a directly related benefit to the sending US 
economy of USD 0.09 per corporate dollar invested in offshoring.5 Benefits to the recipient Indian 
5 This is mainly due to additional exports to India and profits transfers by India-based US providers. Estimating 
additional benefits of saving USD 0.58 per dollar spent due to lower production costs, as well as approximately USD 
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economy, in turn, are estimated at USD 0.33 per dollar (Olsen 2006), which is comparable to our 
results concerning Asian economies, although we use a ln scale. 
Table 13. Mean amount of outsourcing for developing economies as % of GDP
year All countries Asia Eastern Europe Africa Latin America Middle East
2000 2.0 4.8 3.3 1.4 2.5 1.3
2001 2.0 4.0 3.1 1.7 2.2 1.3
2002 2.0 4.1 3.1 1.6 2.2 1.4
2003 2.2 4.0 3.7 1.7 2.3 1.6
2004 2.5 4.6 4.4 1.9 2.4 1.8
2005 2.5 4.6 4.6 2.2 2.5 1.7
2006 2.8 5.0 4.9 2.5 2.9 1.9
2007 2.9 5.3 5.5 2.6 3.5 2.4
2008 2.9 5.1 6.1 2.7 3.7 3.1
2009 2.3 4.1 3.9 2.1 3.0 2.2
2010 2.5 4.7 5.0 3.0 3.3 2.3
2011 3.6 5.3 6.5 3.7 3.8 2.6
2012 3.5 5.5 6.1 3.6 3.8 2.7
Average 2.6 4.7 4.6 2.4 2.9 2.0
6.2. Outsourcing: growth and contribution to overall growth
Factoring in the actual growth of outsourcing, as calculated using our method, we are able to calculate 
its total contribution to the growth of developing economies: an average outsourcing annual growth 
of 6.2% would translate to an average growth contribution (productivity gain) of 0.49% to 0.93% per 
industry-employee GDP per annum, which could be as high as 1.3% in Eastern Europe (due its annual 
growth of 6.9% and average impact of 0.17-0.20%), 0.5% in the case of Asian economies (due its 
annual growth of 1.3% and average impact of 0.37-39%), 0.9% in the Middle East, and 0.6% in Africa 
(Table 14).
Table 14. Mean growth of outsourcing for developing economies as % of GDP
year All countries Asia Eastern Europe Africa Latin America Middle East
2001 -1.4% -17.1% -5.8% 22.2% -12.2% 0.1%
2002 0.9% 3.5% -0.3% -4.9% -3.2% 9.3%
2003 8.2% -3.0% 17.3% 7.0% 6.1% 15.2%
2004 14.7% 13.6% 20.7% 17.9% 3.4% 10.7%
2005 3.6% 0.3% 7.5% 21.1% 5.6% -0.8%
2006 13.1% 8.3% 9.4% 22.0% 15.3% 14.0%
2007 3.3% 5.9% 18.2% 7.4% 23.3% 32.7%
2008 1.2% -4.3% 16.8% 4.2% 5.9% 55.1%
2009 -30.7% -21.5% -65.7% -46.4% -26.8% -66.7%
2010 10.3% 13.2% 33.7% 66.5% 12.0% 10.0%
2011 56.5% 11.5% 45.1% 51.7% 18.4% 20.3%
2012 -5.2% 4.9% -13.4% -7.7% 1.5% 5.3%
Average 6.2% 1.3% 6.9% 13.4% 4.1% 8.8%
0.46 stemming from re-employment of workers who lost their job in the process, they estimate an overall implied 
economic benefit to the United States of between USD 1.12 and USD 1.14 per corporate dollar spent (updated with 
2005 figures the benefit is estimated between USD 1.14 and USD 1.17).
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In particular, the low growth of outsourcing in Asia deserves some discussion. Clearly, higher 
overall level of outsourcing implies slower growth in the first place and as it was seen in the previous 
section, Asia does engage in outsourcing most actively of all regions. In addition to that, however, 
there is another aspect to slower growth – absorptive capacity. Whereas the standard argument 
says that in the presence of positive spillovers offshoring should be promoted and subsidized in the 
recipient economy, Desmet et al. (2008) argue that temporarily restricting offshoring (FDI) might 
be necessary for the successful absorption of the spillovers. The authors’ argument is based on two 
features of spillovers, namely they are limited by the economy’s absorptive capacity on the one hand, 
and they take time to materialize on the other. By letting in capital more gradually, Desmet et al. (2008) 
claim that initial investment has the time to create spillovers and upgrade the economy’s absorptive 
capacity before further investment occurs. Thereby, the economy converges to a steady state with a 
superior technology and a greater capital stock, which seems to be the appropriate description of the 
Asian experience. 
Furthermore, the figures concerning the contribution of industrial outsourcing to growth reported 
here will be significantly lower and will vary depending on the overall importance of the industry 
sector, and employment therein, for the economy of the specific country, as well as the demographics. 
Countries with a demographic window like China, where people in working age (15-65) account 
for over 72% of the population and industry is of primary importance (43% of GDP) will evidently 
benefit more from outsourcing, whereas countries like Guatemala where the population under 15 
represents over 40% and industry accounts for no more than 24% will not benefit as much.6 In this 
sense, in Eastern Europe where industry typically accounts for 20-35% of the economy the 1.3% 
additional growth will be in reality similar to the 0.5% contribution in the case of Asia, where industry 
typically accounts for 30-45% (up to 47% in Indonesia). 
6.3. Why Asia? Government policies, geographical factors and origins of FDI
Why Asia is the largest recipient of outsourcing and why its impacts are most visible there is a 
complex consequence. The question of why Latin America is on the opposite side of the spectrum 
is equally interesting. In view of the GDP growth trends in the past few decades, in which Asian 
developmentalism has proved more successful than Latin American one, various pieces of literature 
have compared and assessed economic developments in these two regions (Hosono and Rivano (1998)). 
Proactive state action is considered to be one of reasons for success to developments.
Special economic zones
Indeed, special economic zones, one of the main effects of direct government action, abound in Asia, 
they can hardly be found in Latin America. The exports coming from SEZ in the year 2006 accounted 
for a staggering 83% of total exports in Malaysia and 80% in Vietnam, while the top performers of 
Latin America only approximate half that amount: Mexico - 47% and Colombia - 40%. 
6 Data: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.
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Stability
Focusing on stability and risk as major factors influencing FDI, Montero (2008) runs a time-series 
analysis of fifteen Latin American economies from 1985 to 2003 and concludes that past performance 
on the current account provides foreign investors with proof of sufficient commitment to stability by 
regional governments and that the type of political regime, good governance, and reform variables are 
inconsistent predictors of FDI in the region.
Indeed, a quick look at the current account balance statistics reveals that Asian emerging economies 
have been performing better than the average for emerging economies, while the opposite is true for 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. The Middle East and North Africa show wild fluctuations, but this 
might be attributed to the fact that the region is heavily dependent on natural resource exports. 
Import substitution versus export-oriented industrialization
The current account balance as a stability proxy theory can be related to the import substitution 
versus export-oriented industrialization argument. Academic literature has noted the conscious effort 
of Asian governments to direct economies towards the latter development path. In the context of 
Latin American development, the period from the 1950s until the 1980s was characterized by import 
substitution industrialization in many Latin American countries and those policies came to be referred 
to as “Latin American structuralism” (Pfefferman, 1997). Export-oriented industrialization, in turn, 
was particularly characteristic of the development of the economies of the Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in the post-World War II period, who set the example for other 
Asian countries to follow. 
Lower costs
Besides exports being directly linked to offshoring, the lower wages in Asia seem to have been 
an additional factor for attracting outsourcing activities, given that one of the main motivations of 
outsourcing is to save on labor costs. The nominal GDP per capita is a good proxy for wages and costs 
(Table 15).
Table 15. Nominal GDP per capita to proxy for wages in 2000-2012
Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Africa Middle East
3526.29 6523.36 5043.39 1320.09 12388.33
The region looks even more attractive considering that the real GDP per industry employee is larger 
than the other regions, suggesting higher productivity (Table 16).
Table 16. Average Non-natural resource industry GDP per employee, 2000-2012
Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Africa Middle East
4907.97 4092.13 3309.81 3002.992 8013.941
Estimating the impact of inward offshore industry outsourcing on developing economiesJune 2015 － 55 －
Spatial factors
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2005) explore how agglomeration and spatial proximity contribute to the 
establishment of technology linkages between foreign transnational corporations and suppliers in 
developing countries. using firm-level data, collected at the bus and truck plants of AB Volvo in China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico, their main finding is that geographic proximity to an international company 
is far more important than transaction and communication costs when it comes to opportunities for 
local firms to absorb external technology. In this regard, Asia certainly holds an advantage over the 
rest of the regions. This becomes evident if population density is used as a proxy for the agglomeration 
of local companies (Table 17).
Table 17. Population density as a proxy for agglomeration of local firms
Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Africa Middle East
320.08 79.98  75.81 87.48 87.30
The origin of FDI and outsourcing and their nature (what industries)
Since outsourcing is to a large extent driven by distance due to high transportation costs, it can be 
assumed that the origin of offshoring in the various developing regions differs significantly. According 
to the ‘triad’ theory of investment blocs (Poon et al., 2000), it would be expected that the major source 
of outsourcing activities in Asian countries would be Japan, the respective sources for Latin America 
would be the USA, and for Eastern Europe it would be Western Europe, Africa and the Middle East 
being mixed, but mostly associated with Western Europe or developed Asia. The origin of offshoring 
activity is also related to the nature of the industrial necessities of the country of origin. In the case of 
Asia, the classical example of outsourcing is the production of car parts and assembly of electronic 
goods, while in Latin America it is the maquiladora-related industries. Thus, the origin of offshoring 
activities might vastly determine the size of the impact on the recipient economy. 
All the factors glossed over in this section are only a brief overview and their importance has been 
widely researched and are subject to further research. The reason their overview is presented here is 
mainly to provide a basis for policy recommendations discussed in the next section. Especially in the 
case of manufacturing it is logically the country of assembly, which is usually the labor-intensive low-
wage country that is the recipient of outsourcing, that needs to import the unfinished goods from either 
the country where the final good is to be exported, or from a third country that has better technology. 
Hence, using intermediate imports as the sole factor in calculating outsourcing, involves the risk of 
calculating the total amount (inward plus outward) outsourcing instead of outward outsourcing only, 
while at the same failing to include outsourcing of the final assembly stage of the valued chain, whose 
output is usually final goods. There is also the risk of not taking into account outsourcing that uses 
inputs originating in the recipient country, and of including intermediate imports from companies in 
the recipient country not engaging in outsourcing practices.
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7. Policy implications and concluding remarks
Based on the results of our analysis, as well as on the Asian experience and the theoretical framework 
concerning the skill intensity of offshoring practices, the following policy recommendations can be 
formulated:
(1)  Countries with a relatively highly skilled labor force should focus on attracting FDI rather 
than outsourcing. This mainly concerns Eastern Europe and upper-middle income economies.
(2)  Countries with skill-scarce labor force should focus on attracting outsourcing contracts rather 
than FDI. This mainly concerns lower-middle and low income economies.
(3)  Economies should focus on building up their absorptive capacity (skill levels) rather than on 
attracting large amounts of offshoring quickly.
(4)  Comparative advantage export-oriented industrialization is preferred over import-substitution 
practices.
(5)  Creating special economic zones and economies-of-scale-style economic ‘agglomerations’ is 
recommended for all developing countries. 
(6)  Maintaining a stable current account balance in order to convince investors and offshoring 
companies that the economic environment is stable.
Although this study has made a step towards estimating the effects of inward offshore outsourcing in 
developing economies by developing a methodology trying to resolve the definitional and estimation 
issues of existing methodologies and to provide the first piece of empirical evidence on a global scale, 
thereby suggesting policy paths for ensuring sustained productivity and economic growth, the results 
and estimation methodologies are far from complete and precise, and future research is crucial in 
order to understand better the implications of outsourcing for the recipient economies. 
In particular, future research should account for intermediate exports by local firms not engaging in 
offshoring practices, as well as non-exported intermediate and final products of outsourcing activities 
intended for domestic consumption. Grasping the range of outsourcing more appropriately also 
remains an issue. Although we have challenged the arbitrary assumptions used by previous empirical 
studies, we still rely on them in the present study, thereby running the risk of calculating the total 
amount (inward plus outward) outsourcing instead of outward outsourcing only, while at the same 
failing to include outsourcing of the final assembly stage of the valued chain, whose output is usually 
final goods. Solving such estimation issues will be the task of future investigations.
According to our research, it turned out that receiving outsourcing could be a driving force of 
success to economic development. However, since some groups might get loss in the process of 
promoting outsourcing, they might oppose its prevalence. But it would be necessary for a country’s 
welfare as a whole, to advance free trade.
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Appendix
Table A. List of variables and their sources
Variable Source
Intermediate imports in BEC 22, 32, 42, 53, 121, total COMTRADE
Intermediate imports in BEC 22, 32, 42, 53, 122, percentage of total imports COMTRADE (calculated)
Number of foreign affiliates in manufacturing ITC (calculated)
Merchandise exports, total value UNCTAD
Manufacturing, value added in GDP World Bank
GDP, total (nominal) World Bank
Inward FDI stock, total UNCTAD
GDP per employed person in the economy World Bank (calculated)
GDP per employed person in manufacturing World Bank (calculated)
GDP, total (nominal) World Bank
GDP, total (purchasing power parity standards) World Bank
GDP, per capita (nominal) World Bank
GDP, per capita (purchasing power parity standards) World Bank
GDP growth rate, total World Bank
GDP growth rate, per capita World Bank
GNI, total World Bank
GNI, total per capita World Bank
Inflation rate IMF
Corporate tax rates World Bank
Inward FDI stock, total UNCTAD
Inward FDI stock, per capita UNCTAD
Inward FDI stock, as a percentage of GDP UNCTAD
GDP per square kilometer in USD World Bank (calculated)
Total imports and exports, total UNCTAD
Total imports and exports, per capita UNCTAD (calculated)
Total imports and exports, as a percentage of GDP UNCTAD
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Merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP UNCTAD
Import volume index (2000 = 100) UNCTAD
Import value index (2000 = 100) UNCTAD
Export volume index (2000 = 100) UNCTAD
Export value index (2000 = 100) UNCTAD
Gross national savings as a percentage of GDP World Bank
Net migration World Bank
GINI index World Bank
GDP percentage generated by the extraction of natural resource World Bank
Logistics index by the World Bank World Bank
Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP World Bank
GDP per unit of energy World Bank
Electricity consumption per capita World Bank
Tertiary enrollment ratio World Bank
Intellectual property payments (USD) World Bank
Intellectual property receipts (USD) World Bank
R&D technicians per million people World Bank
Patent applications by residents World Bank
Labor force participation rates World Bank
Table B. Countries included in the sample
Asia 
(17 countries)
Latin America 
(22 countries)
Eastern Europe 
(25 countries)
Africa 
(34 countries)
Middle East 
(17 countries)
Bangladesh Argentina Albania Benin Algeria
Bhutan Bolivia Armenia Botswana Egypt
China Brazil Azerbaijan Burundi Iran
Hong Kong** Chile Belarus Cameroon Jordan
Macao** Colombia Bosnia CAR Kuwait
India Costa Rica Bulgaria Congo Lebanon
Indonesia Domin. Rep. Croatia Cote d'Ivoire Libya
Malaysia Ecuador Czech Rep. Eritrea Morocco
Mongolia El Salvador Estonia Ethiopia Oman
Nepal Guatemala Georgia Gabon Pakistan
Philippines Guyana Hungary Gambia Qatar
Rep. of Korea Honduras Kazakhstan Ghana Saudi Arabia
Singapore** Jamaica Kyrgyzstan Guinea Syria
Sri Lanka Mexico Latvia Guinea-Bissau Tunisia
Thailand Nicaragua Lithuania Kenya Turkey
Timor-Leste Panama Montenegro Lesotho UAE
Viet Nam Paraguay Poland Madagascar Yemen
Peru Moldova Malawi
Suriname Romania Mali
Tr. & Tobago Russia Mauritania
Uruguay Serbia Mauritius
Venezuela Slovakia Mozambique
Slovenia Namibia
Macedonia Niger
Ukraine Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
South Africa
Sudan
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Togo
Uganda
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
**Excluded from empirical analysis due to being outliers
Table C. The value added of offshore outsourcing using the authors’ methodology
Average annual value added of inward offshore 
industry outsourcing as % of GDP, 2000-2012
Average annual value added of inward offshore 
industry outsourcing, in USD, 2000-2012
Malaysia 16.99 China 341,000,000,000
Hungary 15.03 Mexico 80,900,000,000
Guyana 9.57 Malaysia 77,100,000,000
Papua N.G. 8.73 Thailand 55,600,000,000
Zambia 8.19 India 55,100,000,000
Thailand 7.94 Brazil 48,100,000,000
Costa Rica 7.48 Indonesia 38,500,000,000
Ukraine 7.35 Turkey 34,400,000,000
Philippines 6.65 Hungary 28,200,000,000
Belarus 6.46 Philippines 25,400,000,000
Bosnia 6.38 South Africa 25,200,000,000
Mozambique 6.33 Ukraine 23,900,000,000
Bulgaria 6.10 Argentina 19,600,000,000
Mali 5.74 Romania 14,800,000,000
Mexico 5.57 Peru 9,610,000,000
Romania 5.54 Viet Nam 9,430,000,000
Zimbabwe 5.40 Egypt 9,360,000,000
Macedonia 5.14 Belarus 7,330,000,000
South Africa 4.95 Kazakhstan 6,610,000,000
Tunisia 4.28 Bulgaria 5,630,000,000
Peru 4.22 Iran 5,260,000,000
Jamaica 4.15 Morocco 5,210,000,000
Ghana 4.09 Pakistan 5,100,000,000
Kyrgyzstan 3.87 Colombia 4,620,000,000
China 3.80 Tunisia 3,840,000,000
Turkey 3.56 Costa Rica 3,420,000,000
Jordan 3.50 Zambia 3,070,000,000
Fiji 3.48 Ghana 2,680,000,000
Mauritius 3.36 Venezuela 2,460,000,000
Togo 3.27 Sudan 2,380,000,000
Cote d'Ivoire 3.25 Bosnia 1,960,000,000
Morocco 3.03 Jordan 1,890,000,000
Viet Nam 2.78 Cote d'Ivoire 1,560,000,000
Armenia 2.74 Sri Lanka 1,380,000,000
Kazakhstan 2.65 Guatemala 1,300,000,000
Indonesia 2.53 Panama 1,270,000,000
Guinea 2.51 Lebanon 1,210,000,000
Panama 2.48 Syria 1,180,000,000
Senegal 2.44 Papua N.G. 1,140,000,000
Botswana 2.44 Domin. Rep. 1,100,000,000
Rep. of Moldova 2.28 Mozambique 1,090,000,000
Lebanon 2.20 Zimbabwe 1,090,000,000
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Brazil 2.16 Mali 1,070,000,000
Bolivia 2.01 Tanzania 1,010,000,000
El Salvador 1.85 Bangladesh 973,000,000
Tanzania 1.82 Macedonia 951,000,000
Paraguay 1.82 Bolivia 889,000,000
Sudan 1.77 Jamaica 860,000,000
Honduras 1.66 Ecuador 795,000,000
Guatemala 1.53 El Salvador 749,000,000
Nicaragua 1.49 Kenya 678,000,000
Georgia 1.35 Paraguay 672,000,000
India 1.31 Botswana 596,000,000
Dominican Rep. 1.22 Senegal 581,000,000
Sri Lanka 1.16 Cameroon 496,000,000
Egypt 1.16 Kyrgyzstan 493,000,000
Colombia 1.14 Mauritius 488,000,000
Cameroon 1.11 Honduras 460,000,000
Malawi 1.11 Armenia 408,000,000
Burundi 1.05 Guyana 362,000,000
Pakistan 0.87 Nepal 329,000,000
Kenya 0.86 Nicaragua 329,000,000
Gambia 0.85 Georgia 312,000,000
Albania 0.81 Uganda 276,000,000
Venezuela 0.76 Moldova 273,000,000
Uganda 0.75 Guinea 256,000,000
Gabon 0.71 Togo 222,000,000
Nepal 0.67 Albania 192,000,000
Ecuador 0.64 Fiji 184,000,000
CAR 0.62 Ethiopia 168,000,000
Iran 0.55 Gabon 155,000,000
Benin 0.53 Madagascar 133,000,000
Madagascar 0.53 Algeria 125,000,000
Niger 0.48 Congo 103,000,000
Congo 0.47 Malawi 90,500,000
Bangladesh 0.35 Benin 71,200,000
Ethiopia 0.25 Burundi 60,100,000
Rwanda 0.08 Niger 52,500,000
Algeria 0.05 Gambia 22,200,000
Yemen 0.00 CAR 16,300,000
Nigeria 0.00 Yemen 10,800,000
Azerbaijan 0.00 Rwanda 10,400,000
Table D. Top Rated Outsourcing Countries according to major consulancies (2014)
AT Kearney (2014) Clutch (2014) Tholons (2014)
Gartner, Inc.  
2010-11 
(not ranked)
Sourcing Line 
Rankings (2014)
India India India Argentina India
China Indonesia Philippines Brazil Indonesia
Malaysia Estonia Poland Chile China
Mexico Singapore Ireland Colombia Bulgaria
Indonesia Bulgaria China Costa Rica Philippines
Thailand China Costa Rica Mexico Jordan
Philippines Philippines Czech Rep Panama Singapore
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Brazil Lithuania Vietnam Peru Thailand
Bulgaria Thailand Malaysia Bangladesh Lithuania
Egypt Malaysia Sri Lanka China Egypt
Poland Chile Brazil India Malaysia
Viet Nam Egypt South Africa Indonesia Estonia
Chile Jordan Chile Malaysia Chile
US Czech Rep Hungary Philippines Hungary
Lithuania Hungary Argentina Sri Lanka Poland
Sri Lanka Poland Singapore Thailand Czech Rep
Germany Argentina Russia Vietnam Ukraine
Romania Latvia Canada Bulgaria Romania
UAE Sri Lanka Uruguay Czech Rep Latvia
Jordan Vietnam Romania Egypt Vietnam
Russia Costa Rica Mexico Hungary 　
Estonia Mexico Ghana Mauritius 　
Latvia Jamaica UK Morocco 　
Costa Rica Romania Slovakia Poland 　
Pakistan Russia Colombia Romania 　
Bangladesh Ukraine Ukraine Russia 　
UK Ghana Bulgaria Slovakia 　
Tunisia Israel Estonia South Africa 　
Ghana South Africa Slovenia Turkey 　
Panama Kenya Peru Ukraine 　
Hungary Canada Indonesia 　 　
Spain Panama Morocco 　 　
Czech Rep Senegal USA 　 　
Morocco Pakistan Puerto Rico 　 　
Slovakia USA Turkey 　 　
Mauritania UAE Taiwan 　 　
Canada Tunisia Egypt 　 　
Argentina Brazil South Korea 　 　
Turkey 　 Australia 　 　
Senegal 　 Thailand 　 　
Ukraine 　 Nicaragua 　 　
